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Abstract 
This paper provides a detailed analysis and explores the prospects of the 
arguments for higher-level causal autonomy available for the proponents 
of the mechanistic framework. Three different arguments (a context-
based, an organisation-based, and a constraint-based) are distinguished. 
After clarifying previously raised worries with regard to the first two 
arguments, the paper focuses on the newest version of the third argument 
that has recently been revived by William Bechtel. By using Bechtel’s own 
case study, it is shown that not even reference to constraints can establish 
the causal autonomy of higher mechanistic levels. 
1. Introduction 
The mechanistic approach aims at accounting for a target phenomenon — typ-
ically the behaviour of a higher-level whole — in terms of an underlying mech-
anism constituted by the organised activities of lower-level parts that jointly 
produce the very higher-level behaviour in question (Machamer et al. 2000; 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Illari and Williamson 2012). Mechanistic explan-
ations dominate the biological and life sciences (Craver 2007; Craver and 
Darden 2013), are also important in the physical and engineering sciences 
(Glennan and Illari, 2018), and are even claimed to be able to contribute to our 
understanding of causation (Glennan 1996, 2010, 2017). Nevertheless, the onto-
logical commitments and metaphysical implications of the mechanistic frame-
work are far from being clear (Fazekas and Kertész 2011; Soom 2012; Rosenberg 
2015; Eronen 2015; Kaiser and Krickel 2016; Krickel 2019). 
This paper focuses on the metaphysical implications of the mechanistic 
approach with regard to the causal autonomy of higher levels. Can higher-level 
wholes be autonomous with respect to the corresponding lower-level mechan-
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isms underlying them and producing their characteristic behaviour? According 
to a wide consensus, they certainly can in an epistemological sense. But what 
about causal autonomy? Can higher-level wholes possess unique causal powers? 
This question is hotly debated. On the one hand, it has recently been argued 
that the causal autonomy of higher-level entities is incompatible with some core 
commitments of the mechanistic approach (Fazekas and Kertész 2011; Soom 
2012; Rosenberg 2015). On the other hand, William Bechtel routinely presents 
the mechanistic framework as one that is well equipped to ensure the autonomy 
of higher-level entities even in a strict causal sense (Bechtel 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2017a, 2017b; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2008). 
In this paper our aim is to advance this debate by providing a detailed ana-
lysis and exploring the prospects of the arguments for higher-level causal 
autonomy available for the proponents of the mechanistic framework. Mechan-
ists argue for causal autonomy relying on an entangled mixture of different ar-
guments, so the first goal of our endeavour is to disentangle the relevant parts of 
the literature, and to reconstruct the different arguments in play. We will distin-
guish three different arguments: a context-based, an organisation-based, and a 
constraint-based type that are independently motivated by different commit-
ments. 
The context-based and organisation-based arguments have played a central 
role at previous stages of the debate, and have been in the focus of recent objec-
tions (Fazekas and Kertész, 2011; Soom, 2012; Rosenberg, 2015). In his recent 
contributions, Bechtel tries to discredit these objections (Bechtel, 2017a, 2017b), 
so the second goal of our paper is to clarify how the context-based and organisa-
tion-based arguments can be answered. 
In his most recent papers Bechtel also emphasises the importance of a 
third kind, a constraint-based argument for the causal autonomy of higher 
mechanistic levels (Bechtel, 2017a, 2017b). On the face of it, this line of thought 
is able to evade existing objections and bestow higher-level entities with unique 
causal powers. The third and major goal of our paper is to argue that this, how-
ever, is not the case. By using Bechtel’s own case study, we will show that not 
even reference to constraints can establish the causal autonomy of higher mech-
anistic levels. 
2. Background: mechanisms, levels and causal autonomy 
The mechanistic programme targets a characteristic behaviour of an entity, and 
aims to describe the mechanism that produces the behaviour in question. Mech-
anistic explanations proceed via (1) identifying working parts (Bechtel 2008) or 
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components (Craver 2007) of the target entity, (2) describing the specific spatial 
and temporal organisation of the parts, and (3) demonstrating that the overall 
activity of the components organised in such a way is able to produce the beha-
viour in question (Machamer et al. 2000; Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008).  
The spatially and temporally arranged operations of the parts constitute 
the behaviour of the target entity in the sense that the organised overall activity 
of the parts exhibit the target behaviour (Craver, 2007). That is, according to the 
logic of this framework, the mechanistic agenda is to find those components 
whose joint operations result in the very behaviour that the mechanistic pro-
gramme aims at accounting for.  
The mechanistic approach works with a multi-level picture: the target 
phenomenon is at a higher level while the entities that together produce the 
characteristic behaviour of the target are at a lower level (Craver 2007; Bechtel 
2008). Levels are defined in terms of the working parts the organised activity of 
which constitutes the target phenomenon. Entities are at the same level if they 
are the working parts of the same mechanism: “[i]t is the set of working parts 
that are organised and whose operations are coordinated to realise the phe-
nomenon of interest that constitute a level” (Bechtel 2008, 146). Similarly, entit-
ies are at different levels if one of them (the lower-level entity) is a working part 
of a mechanism that produces the behaviour characteristic of the other one (the 
higher-level entity): “X’s φ-ing is at a lower mechanistic level than S’s ψ-ing if 
and only if X’s φ-ing is a component in the mechanism for S’s ψ-ing” (Craver 
2007, 189). 
Since the behaviour of a component can similarly be analysed in terms of 
the organised activities of still lower level entities, the mechanistic framework 
presents the world as a nested hierarchy of mechanisms, in which entities resid-
ing at a lower level form a mechanism that produces the behaviour of a higher 
level entity that is a working part of a higher level mechanism, etc. 
Those who argue for the causal autonomy of higher levels claim that 
higher levels are not just causally potent (which would be true even if the causal 
powers of higher-level entities were also the powers of certain lower-level entit-
ies; see e.g. the subset view: Shoemaker, 2007) but also possess unique causal 
powers. As it has lately been emphasised, such an argument for causal 
autonomy needs to start with establishing the claim that lower levels are caus-
ally not closed (Hendry 2010). William Bechtel (2017a, 2017b) has recently 
taken up the challenge and tried to demonstrate that the way higher level con-
straints and boundary conditions work disproves the causal closedness of lower 
levels, renders the mechanism as a whole not just causally potent, but also caus-
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ally autonomous, and helps evade the causal exclusion argument (Kim 1998). 
Note that to support such a causal autonomy claim one needs to demonstrate 
that the causal influence a higher-level entity exerts to determine the unfolding 
of some lower-level events uniquely belongs to the higher-level, ie. it is not exer-
ted by any lower-level entity. 
3. Arguments for higher-level causal autonomy 
Over the last two decades many attempts to argue for the causal autonomy of 
higher levels have been published, often presenting an entangled web of three 
different arguments. 
3.1 The argument from context 
An important consequence of how the mechanistic framework defines the cri-
teria of being at the same level and being at different levels (see Sec. 2) is that 
levels of mechanisms are local: they are well-defined only within a given com-
positional hierarchy. If two entities are not working parts of the same mechan-
ism, then there is no meaningful way to address the question whether they are 
at the same level (Craver 2007, 192; Bechtel 2008, 147). Due to this locality, 
lower levels are never causally closed, since lower levels are never extended bey-
ond the set of entities that together constitute a mechanism, and thus they are 
always restricted and partial. So within the mechanistic framework there are no 
comprehensive lower levels that are causally complete and closed (Bechtel 2008, 
148). Local levels restricted to the constituents of a mechanism typically lack 
resources to account for effects exerted from outside the mechanism, i.e. from 
the context in which the higher-level whole is embedded (Bechtel 2007, 183; 
2008, 152). As a consequence, such lower level effects will have only higher level 
causes. 
3.2 The argument from organisation 
The spatial arrangement of the entities forming a mechanism and the temporal 
organisation of their activities are crucial determinants of a mechanism. How-
ever, just as resources necessary to account for contextual effects, resources re-
quired to account for arrangement and organisation are also unavailable at the 
lower level of the parts. The spatial and temporal structure of the parts is inde-
pendent of their behaviour: parts conforming to the same laws and producing 
identical behavioral repertoire in isolation can nevertheless be organised into 
very different structures (Bechtel 2007, 183). This organisation is imposed upon 
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the parts by the higher level whole (Bechtel 2008, 150; 2009, 554-57), and thus is 
a manifestation of the unique causal powers of higher levels. 
3.3 The argument from constraints 
The spatial and temporal organisation of the parts constrains the behaviour of 
the parts: modes of organisation imposed on the constituents restrict how they 
can interact with each other (Bechtel 2009, 555-57). Similarly, the functioning of 
the mechanism as a whole in its higher-level context impinges specific condi-
tions upon the mechanism that, at least partly, dictate how the parts can operate 
(Bechtel 2008, 240; 2009, 557-59). So by imposing a structure on the parts and 
by interacting with its environment the higher level whole constrains the beha-
viour of the parts — which is an extra causal influence on what happens inside 
the mechanism exerted by higher level entities, and thus a further source of the 
causal autonomy of higher levels (Bechtel 2017a, 271). 
4. Clarifying the answers to the arguments from context and 
organisation 
Recent criticisms of the idea that higher mechanistic levels are causally 
autonomous provided reasons to resist the arguments from context and organ-
isation. It has been argued that the way the mechanistic framework thinks 
about constitution, causation and levels are incompatible with the main claims 
of these arguments.  
4.1 Identifying higher and lower level causal roles 
It is a fundamental tenet of the mechanistic framework that the organised activ-
ity of the constituent parts of a mechanism produces the very behaviour that 
characterises the target phenomenon, since this is the requirement that ensures 
the success of explaining a higher-level phenomenon mechanistically in terms of 
the behaviour and organisation of certain lower-level entities. If the behaviour 
produced by the organised activity of the lower-level entities was not identical 
to the characteristic behaviour of the target phenomenon, then the mechanistic 
story would clearly not be an account of the target phenomenon (Fazekas and 
Kertész 2011; Soom 2012; Rosenberg 2015). That is, the mechanistic framework 
is inherently committed to identifying the causal roles a whole plays at the high-
er-level with the causal roles the organised activity of the parts plays at the 
lower-level. So, even if causal processes at different levels look different, they are 
not different—in fact, the corresponding ones must be identical (Bechtel 2008, 
2009; Fazekas and Kertész 2011).  
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Note that this picture is not eliminativist, for higher-level entities are 
token-identical with sets of lower-level ones. It is not epiphenomenalist either, 
for higher-level entities do possess causal powers — the same causal powers that 
are also possessed by certain spatially and temporally structured sets of lower 
level entities (see Fazekas and Kertész 2011; Soom 2012). This latter point needs 
special emphasis, given that Bechtel interprets his opponents as if they were ar-
guing for the unjustified extreme view, which is “highly reductionist”, “repres-
ents all activity at one lowest level” (Bechtel 2017a, 269) and renders “higher 
levels epiphenomenal” (Bechtel 2017a, 262; for such a view see Rosenberg 2015). 
Contrary to this, the picture advocated here is compatible with the usefulness of 
higher-level enquiries (as the only sources of higher level descriptions), and the 
importance and significance of higher-level accounts (as the only sources of cer-
tain generalisations, as say, in the case of multiple realisability); i.e. it is compat-
ible with the epistemic or explanatory autonomy of higher levels. What it is in-
compatible with is the view Bechtel wants to argue for: the causal autonomy of 
higher levels. 
4.2 Answering the argument from context 
Another commitment explicitly endorsed by proponents of the mechanistic 
framework is that causation is an intra-level phenomenon: causal links do not 
span between different levels, they are confined to single levels. As Craver and 
Bechtel put it: “[t]here are no causal interactions beyond those at a level” (2007, 
561; see also Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008, 2017; Fazekas and Kertész 2011). Note, 
however, that this commitment to causation as an exclusively intra-level phe-
nomenon is in tension with the claim that levels are local. Due to locality, even 
if it is possible to analyse two entities that are interacting, causally connected 
parts of a mechanism in terms of lower-level sub-mechanisms, it is not possible 
to decide whether the lower-level parts constituting the sub-mechanism respons-
ible for the behaviour of one of the entities are at the same level as the lower-
level parts constituting the other sub-mechanism (Craver 2007). 
The problem with this consequence of locality is the following: (i) in ac-
cordance with the logic of mechanistic explanations, the organised activity of 
the parts constituting the sub-mechanisms produce the very behaviours that are 
characteristic of the entities analysed; (ii) if an interaction between the two en-
tities is part of this behaviour then there will be an interaction between the two 
sub-mechanisms as well; (iii) and if causality is strictly an intra-level phenomen-
on then the causal connection between the two sub-mechanisms entails that the 
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two sub-mechanisms are at the same level (Fazekas and Kertész 2011; Eronen 
2015). 
That is lower levels can be extended beyond the original scope of mechan-
istic enquiry. Consequently, lower levels are not necessarily restricted and in-
complete, and thus there is no principled reason to think that they are causally 
not closed. In particular, note that the higher-level context that plays a crucial 
role in the ‘argument from context’ is the higher-level environment of the entit-
ies targeted by mechanistic decomposition. This environment consists of those 
higher-level entities that interact with the entity under scrutiny. Since lower 
levels can be extended exactly along the lower-level counterparts of such higher-
level connections, contrary to the claim of the ‘argument from context’, re-
sources are very much available at the lower-level to account for the effects exer-
ted by the context of the mechanism (Fazekas and Kertész 2011, Soom 2012). 
4.3 Answering the argument from organisation 
Bechtel explicitly argues that how the components are spatially, temporally, and 
relationally organised go beyond the account of the parts and their operations. 
However, a lower-level account is not restricted to the (intrinsic) characteristics 
of the parts and the behavioural repertoire they produce in isolation. Thinking 
so would simply misidentify the supervenience base of the higher level entity 
under scrutiny. The organisation of the lower-level parts crucially determines 
what kind of behaviour the overall mechanism produces. So a lower-level ac-
count must include information about the spatial and temporal structure of the 
parts, and their interactions. In fact, the organisation of parts can only be ac-
counted for at the lower-level, since it is the lower-level methodology that can 
target lower-level entities and thus can uncover their organisation, and it is the 
lower-level terminology that is apt for describing the parts and their structure. 
Note that these are criteria that Bechtel himself proposes as ways to characterise 
higher and lower levels: he claims that at higher and lower levels different exper-
imental and explanatory strategies and different vocabularies are needed 
(Bechtel 2007, 185; 2008, 155-57). That is, since spatial, temporal and relational 
facts of lower-level entities are discovered by lower-level enquiries, and are char-
acterised by lower-level vocabularies, by Bechtel’s own standards they are very 
much integral parts of lower-level accounts (Fazekas and Kertész 2011). 
5. Answering the argument from constraints 
Bechtel (2017a) acknowledges that there is room for debate with regard to his 
approach to the autonomy of higher levels. As he admits, he and Craver have 
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“failed to bring out in what sense higher levels are involved in producing […] 
effects at the lower-level” (Bechtel 2017a, 254). Bechtel aims to clarify this issue 
by emphasising the role constraints play in shaping lower-level causal processes, 
i.e. by providing a refined version of the ‘argument from constraints’. 
Bechtel claims that parts embedded in a mechanism behave differently 
than in isolation because of the restrictions imposed upon them (Bechtel 2017a, 
271). These restrictions limit the behavioural repertoire of the parts by radically 
reducing the degrees of freedom available to them, thereby forcing them into a 
narrow behavioural space. Bechtel emphasises those cases in which restrictions 
are generated by feedback loops. Feedback makes the behaviour of the individu-
al components sensitive to the actual state of the whole mechanism that they are 
embedded in. Since such a state can change in accordance with a characteristic 
dynamics, the observable behaviour of the parts can also change with time res-
ulting in surprising patterns of different effects evoked by the same input 
(Bechtel 2017a, 272-273).  
Note that on the face of it this strategy has the potential to avoid the wor-
ries raised with regard to the arguments from context and organisation. Even if 
the causal roles of higher-level wholes (the behaviours produced as responses to 
specific influences) are identical to the causal roles of sets of interacting lower-
level parts constituting a mechanism, and even if lower levels are extendable 
along the causal connections of the lower-level entities constituting the mechan-
ism to non-constituents outside the mechanism boundary, constraints can still 
restrict what can happen inside the mechanism. If such constraining effects can 
be attributed to no lower-level entities but only to the higher-level whole, then 
the ‘argument from constraints’ goes through, and the higher-level proves to be 
causally autonomous. (Here we follow Bechtel who argues that constraints are 
causal. For a different view, see, for example: Paoletti and Orilia 2017, 4-7.) 
5.1 A case study: the circadian clock mechanism  
Bechtel’s own case-study to support the ‘argument from constraints’ is about 
the intra-cellular molecular ‘clock mechanism’ that is responsible for circadian 
rhythmicity — cyclic oscillations of daily behaviours and physiological func-
tions. The molecular clock mechanism partly consists of a transcriptional-trans-
lational feedback loop involving so-called ‘clock genes’ Per and Cry and their 
protein products PER and CRY. Inside the nucleus, transcription factors 
BMAL1 and CLOCK drive the transcription of the genes Per and Cry to RNAs, 
which then are decoded by ribosomes to produce proteins PER and CRY. After 
a translocation back to the nucleus, PER and CRY inhibit the transcriptional 
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effects of BMAL1 and CLOCK through direct protein-protein interactions. Via 
this negative feedback loop PER and CRY autoregulate their own transcription, 
which results in a periodic increase and decrease in their concentration, and 
defines the phases of the oscillation of the clock mechanism. During the night 
PER and CRY concentration is high, while it is low during the day such that it 
peaks in the middle of the night after which it decreases and bottoms out in the 
middle of the day. Correspondingly, the level of Per and Cry transcription is low 
during the night, increases at dawn as PER and CRY concentration falls, at its 
maximum during the day and then decreases at dusk (the presentation here is 
simplified; for full details see Rosenwasser and Turek 2017). That is, the tran-
scription of Per and Cry, which is a component of the mechanism, depends on 
the phase of the oscillation, and thus is sensitive to the actual state of the mech-
anism as a whole (Bechtel 2017a, 257). The constraining effects of the higher 
level whole on the behaviour of the components can most clearly be seen, 
Bechtel argues, in the different effects of light exposure on Per transcription at 
different times of the day: while light input has no effect during daytime, at 
dusk it delays, whereas at dawn it advances the phase of the oscillation (Bechtel 
2017a, 267).  
Bechtel’s claim here is that characteristics of the lower-level mechanism, 
like the behaviour of certain parts (the level of transcription of Per and Cry), 
and how the organised activity of the parts processes a given input (exposure to 
light) are determined by the actual state of the higher-level whole (the phase of 
the oscillation). Recall that Bechtel uses this example to support his ‘argument 
from constraints’ against the causal closure of the lower-level and for the causal 
autonomy of the higher-level (see e.g. Bechtel 2017a, 272). So the claim that he 
really needs is that the way in which the higher-level whole determines the un-
folding of lower-level events is via a causal influence, and that no lower-level en-
tity exerts the same causal influence. Does Bechtel’s own example support this 
claim? 
5.2 Constraining effects are exerted by lower-level entities  
Bechtel crucially relies on the phase of the oscillation of the circadian clock 
mechanism as the determinant of how lower-level processes unfold. The phase 
of the oscillation, however, is not a characteristic of some higher-level whole 
that has no counterpart at the lower level. On the contrary, the molecular de-
scription that characterises the clock mechanism can and does define the phases 
in purely lower-level (molecular) terms: as the periodic changes in the concen-
trations of PER and CRY (see above, also Rosenwasser and Turek 2017, 352-55). 
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So the phase of the oscillation is not some higher-level factor that causes changes 
in the level of transcription of Per and Cry in a way such that the relevant causal 
power is not possessed by any lower-level entity. It is the changes in the concen-
trations of PER and CRY that cause changes in the level of transcription of Per 
and Cry — via the direct protein-protein interactions with BMAL1 and 
CLOCK inhibiting their drive of the transcription of Per and Cry. Similarly, it 
is not the phase of the oscillation, as a higher-level entity per se, that constrains 
how the parts of the mechanism change their behaviour as a response to a light 
signal, but the actual level of concentrations of PER and CRY (see Bechtel 
2017a, 267-68). 
Interestingly, Bechtel is in agreement with us with regard to the presence 
and importance of these lower-level interactions. He acknowledges that “the 
phase of the oscillator at a time just is the concentrations of PER, 
CRY” (Bechtel 2017a, 257, our emphasis). And he also acknowledges that “[a]s a 
result of the interconnectivity of the parts, especially the feedback loops, the 
[...] mechanism functions as a unit, with the operations of the individual parts 
of the mechanism determined by other parts of the mechanism” (Bechtel 2017a, 
268, our emphasis). Nevertheless, he thinks that these interactions are compat-
ible with the causal autonomy of higher levels (Bechtel 2017a, 272). But they are 
not. These interactions, by ensuring that the lower-level effects in question have 
lower-level causes, causally close the lower-level with regard to the behaviours 
under scrutiny, and leave no room for the causal autonomy of the higher-level. 
Per, Cry, PER, CRY, BMAL1, CLOCK, etc. are interacting working parts 
of the clock mechanism, and as such — by the standards of Bechtel’s own defini-
tion that puts working parts of a mechanism at a lower level than the whole the 
behaviour of which is produced by the mechanism (Bechtel 2008; see also 
Craver 2007) — they are lower-level entities. Furthermore, they, their interac-
tions, their spatial arrangement and the temporal organisation of their activities 
are all studied by lower-level methodologies, and characterised by lower-level 
vocabularies (see Sec. 4.3). Is there contextual information that cannot be cap-
tured at this level? No: the relevant contextual information concerns the effect 
of light on the phase of the clock mechanisms — but this is also defined in terms 
of the lower level, as the boosting effect of light on Per and Cry transcription. 
What is left? Nothing. All information is there at the lower level, and all causal 
influences can be exerted by lower-level entities. The higher level possesses no 
unique causal powers that couldn’t be attributed to some lower-level factor. 
Therefore, the higher-level is not causally autonomous. 
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Bechtel is right that feedback loops are important. But they are important 
as parts of lower-level interactions. Having an account of how feedback loops 
actually work reveals how lower-level processes impose complex constraints 
upon their own unfolding, and thus, instead of disproving, it contributes to ap-
preciating the causal closedness of the lower level. 
6. Conclusion: higher mechanistic levels are not causally 
autonomous 
Here we distinguished three different arguments for the causal autonomy of 
higher mechanistic levels: the arguments from context, organisation and con-
straints. Upon closer reflection, it is evident that the constraining effects that 
restrict and determine the behaviours of lower-level parts are brought about by 
the interactions between lower-level entities. Parts embedded in a mechanism 
behave differently than in isolation because they are in constant interactions 
with other parts of the mechanism and also with further entities external to the 
original mechanism. These interactions internal and external to a given mechan-
ism are what define the organisation of the parts and the context of the mechan-
ism, respectively, thereby encoding both organisation and context based con-
straints at the lower-level. The effects of context, organisation and constraints 
can all be accounted for in terms of the causal influences of lower level entities 
and activities. That is, within the mechanistic framework, the causal autonomy 
of higher levels cannot be established. 
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